EDUCATIONAL ABILITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:
WHAT SHOULD THE RELATIONSHIP BE? ¹

David P. Ericson
University of California, Los Angeles

Frederick S. Ellett, Jr.
University of Western Ontario

As Thomas F. Green points out, in the politics of education, the magnitude of resources allocated to the educational system and the way those allocated resources are distributed within it (e.g., education funding formulae) seem to be among the most fundamental and contentious problems confronting it.² Yet, as he further seeks to establish, such a view is deceptively simple. For few, other than employees of the educational system, would care how much monies are allocated to the system or how such monies are distributed within it unless there was thought to be a strong connection between them and the subsequent distribution of educational benefits to individual students (or to socially defined groups of students) by the system. We seem to care about the bucks, in other words, only because they are thought to influence the size of the bang (levels of educational achievement) and its spread among students. Thus, it is the benefits of education (knowledge, skills, standards of civility, etc.) and the shape of their distribution between individuals and groups that are ultimately fundamental and the ultimate target of educational policy disputes.

Moreover, the ultimate concern with the magnitude and distribution of educational benefits by the educational system is also reinforced — at least within contemporary “developed” societies — by the way that social and economic inequalities are often legitimated. For we often appeal to the principle that a person merits or deserves a better job or higher income because of higher levels of educational achievement and system level attainment than someone else. In other words, the distribution of educational benefits by the educational system is thought to (and ought to) influence the subsequent distribution of life chances by the social system.

Both the distributive behavior of the educational system and the distributive behavior of the social system raise questions of social justice. For it is always relevant to ask whether the “mechanisms” by which the distributions are effected and the ultimate shape of those distributions are fair or just. Here we shall only be concerned with the justice of the bases for distributing educational benefits and the subsequent distribution they may yield within the educational system. As suggested, however, these issues are highly relevant to social justice in society, even if space limitations allow no further mention of that vexing topic.

Now there are several major problems to be addressed in devising a reasonable conception of the just distribution of educational benefits and opportunities. One of the major ones is the following: What should be the relationship between educational ability and the distribution of educational benefits? For it is plausible to think that ability is one of the main “mechanisms” in the distribution of educational benefits. In particular, we shall ask whether justice requires (or encourages, at least) the educational system to distribute educational benefits in direct proportion to educational ability. As we shall see, the issues involved are most complex.

I. THE “OUTCOMES” CONCEPTION
OF EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY

James S. Coleman, the noted sociologist, was quite aware that his work advocated that the older conception of equal educational opportunity be replaced by his so-called “outcomes” conception of equal opportunity.³ In the older conception, students who started school with the same initial abilities would be treated equally when they received the same educational outcomes (equal levels of educational benefits). But Coleman, who was rightfully concerned about the different starting points of students from different socially recognized groups, maintained that justice requires that unequals be treated to ensure rough equality. That is, Coleman held that justice requires that those groups who started school with apparently lower levels of educational benefits should, as a result of their schooling, eventually come to have the same educational outcomes as those with apparently higher levels of educational benefits.

It is unclear what factors explain the ready acceptance by so many educators of Coleman’s outcomes conception for groups. In large part, we believe that most people assumed that the two conceptions of equal opportunity were compatible: when the outcomes conception for groups was satisfied, so too would be the older conception of equal opportunity for individuals. If the world were in such an arrangement, then the newer conception added a novel aspect for groups, but it still honored the older conception’s view of individual equality concerning equal abilities.

Let us make some realistic assumptions that, for the different groups (who start school with different levels of educational benefits), the individuals within each of the groups are distributed rather widely. Let us also assume that there is no (known) way for ensuring that every individual reach the same outcome. In order for unequals to be treated equally, some of the members of the (initially) lower group must catch up with (and perhaps surpass) some of the members of the (originally) higher group. Otherwise, the lower group’s (average) outcomes would remain lower than the higher group’s (average) outcomes. But if one focuses upon those individuals who have a given initial level of educational benefits, then one can see that Coleman’s principle requires that (some of the) members of the lower group must gain more than (some of the) members of the higher group. Otherwise, the lower group individuals would (at best) keep pace with the individuals of the higher group, and the (aggregate) differences would remain the same between the group means. Given certain reasonable assumptions, therefore, the satisfaction of Coleman’s principle leads to the apparent violation of equality for individuals. Hence, not only are the two principles logically distinct, as Coleman noted, but also the principles seem incapable of joint satisfaction and may be incompatible. To honor the new group conception may be to violate the older conception of equality for individuals. We believe that had more people been fully aware of the seeming conflict, then fewer would have rushed to embrace the new group conception (especially given a strong tradition of individualism).

Coleman was, of course, working within a neo-logical positivist conception of social science.⁴ His conception of equality (nicely) built upon an emphasis on examining group means at the start of schooling and on group means for the “outcomes” of schooling.

Green’s Critique

Thomas F. Green’s philosophical critique recognized the importance of Coleman’s work. In particular, Green recognized the importance behind the shift to the group conception of equal opportunity. In critiquing Coleman’s view, he was concerned to draw out a key hidden assumption.⁵ Green argued that for Coleman to maintain that unequals should be treated equally is to assume that the different groups had the same (level of) native (innate) abilities. Green offered two main relevant observations: one logical and one ethical. First, if the groups were originally equal in native abilities, then one might argue that the beginning school differences were due to earlier differences in upbringing (perhaps amenable to eradication by long-term educational treatment as Coleman seemed to urge). But it isn’t clear to us that Coleman assumed or was required to assume that the groups were equal in native ability. Even given Coleman’s principle, one could adopt a Christopher Jencks-like view that justice requires overcoming the innate differences (if there are any). This latter view only assumes that any differences between groups are (at least partially) removeable over time.

Green’s second observation involves ethical considerations. Green maintains that it would not be just for the educational system to distribute educational benefits proportionately to an individual’s native ability.⁶ In other words, inequalities in educational outcomes for individuals can be morally justified if they result from inequalities in the distribution of ability. Assuming the correctness of this view, let us couple it with the hidden assumption that Green finds in Coleman’s principle to the effect that there are no mean differences in native ability between groups. (Individuals within groups or within the population as a whole may differ widely in ability, but the group means are [roughly] the same.) Quite apart from Green’s own views, the two observations when paired entail that it is logically possible to satisfy the older and newer conceptions of equal opportunity conjointly. For since the group means in ability are the same, satisfying the equality for individuals principle at one and the same time brings about the equality of group means educational outcomes! The older and newer principles of equal opportunity seem to be compatible after all. A price, however, is paid by invoking the conception of innate ability. For it would seem that one would therefore have to attend to all the difficult conceptual and empirical problems arising from the actual determination of innate ability. We’ll set these issues to the side here and simply (implausibly no doubt) assume the issues can be resolved with a modicum of success.

Our real concern focuses on the status of a positive rendering of Green’s principle of distributive justice in the educational system: distributive justice is served when educational benefits are distributed proportionately to one’s native ability. Though Green quite rightly notes that it is easier to agree when injustice occurs than to agree on a principle of justice that would bless such a distribution (which accounts for his negative formulation in his 1971 paper).⁷ But we would like to pursue the question of how far the positive rendering of the principle of justice can be maintained by those such as Ackerman,⁸ Gutmann,⁹ and Rawls¹⁰ who hold that one’s native abilities are distributed by the “natural lottery.”

II. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY

Before we pursue our major concern, let us give a sympathetic rendering of the principle that educational benefits (E.B.) should be distributed proportionately to one’s natural abilities (N.A.). For simplicity, we’ll assume that the basic issues can be studied in the unidimensional case of ability. Now, in the strict sense, proportionality would require very special kinds of scales for N.A. and E.B. Whatever one feels about the measurement scale of ability, it is doubtful that a ratio (or interval) scale exists for E.B. Thus, it appears quite unrealistic to assume that the form of the relationship is a strict mathematical function, E.B.= N.A. x R, for some R, the constant of proportionality. The difficulty seems to be that, at best, an ordinal ranking exists for educational benefits.

Let us assume, therefore, that both N.A. and E.B. have ordinal ranking scales. This modest assumption would enable one to reformulate the “proportionality” principle among the following individuals. First, the E.B. distribution should preserve the ordering of the natural abilities of individuals, so that an individual X gets more E.B.’s than individual Y if and only if individual X has more N.A. than Y (and so on). But more than order-preservation is required to catch the spirit of the positive rendering of the proportionality principle, for an orderpreserving relationship could give too much (or too little) to individuals at certain native ability levels. So we will assume it maintains that a Ph.D. (faux proxy for a level of E.B.’s within the educational system) is merited by someone with a 130 I.Q. (faux proxy for a certain level of N.A.), and so on. Actually, this fixing of the appropriate amount is a very vexing question that deserves a lot more attention elsewhere. Here we make this modest and quick assumption so that we can get to the heart of the proportionality principle, namely that it is orderpreserving with appropriate levels. (Notice that equal opportunity for individuals and for groups can be recast in terms of order-preservation.)

Let us begin by asking whether justice requires that the principle be satisfied. As Green points out, some person may underachieve (and thereby get fewer E.B.’s proportionately) because they choose to forego educational opportunities provided by the system (e.g., the Old Order Amish).¹¹ Of course we would strongly object if the system forced certain individuals to forego such opportunities in the non-selective part of the educational system (say, K - 12). And we may well object if school officials provide little or no information that allows individuals to make an informed choice about opportunities. This is one objection to “tracking,” for example. Thus, the question of choice shows that proportionality is not necessary for justice-served.

Moreover, there are the cases where individuals “overachieve,” where they do better than what proportionality would yield through hard work, diligence, and perseverance. It is hard to see how we might object to his kind of overachiever. Also, it is difficult to object to cases in which individuals are compelled to engage in high pay-off educational activities that they would not otherwise choose (a demanding curriculum, say) that forces them to higher levels of E.B.’s than consonant with their abilities. At any rate, it is unlikely that justice requires proportionality.

Amy Gutmann’s position on the distribution of educational goods in a democracy also violates the proportionality principle. She maintains that a democratic education need only get everyone above a certain threshold of knowledge and know-how needed for citizenship. She thus maintains this irrespective of ability.¹² And certain arguments appealing to humanity might well claim that those on the lower end of the ability range should be brought up to a certain minimum E.B. level, even if one accepts proportionality for the middle and higher ranges. We accept this argument when we provide “disproportionate” monies for special education resources. In short, given the numerous opportunities for legitimate over- and under- achieving, it appears that a just distribution could be far from proportional to the distribution of N.A. in the population.

Green does say, however, that there should be no objection if those with the highest N.A.’s come to possess the highest levels of E.B.’s. We have already seen that it is empirically possible for those with middling abilities to work hard and overachieve to the highest E.B. levels. So why shouldn’t the brightest receive the highest? Though Green modestly claims that if proportionality is actualized, it is at least compatible with justice, we might regard such a distribution as sufficient for justice (assuming compassion for special education populations is different from our concern for justice). Thus, we might well regard proportionality as a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for a just distribution.

III. PROPORTIONALITY DENIED

But can we truly regard proportionality as sufficient for justice? Can we even regard it as being weakly compatible with justice? Recall that William Frankena has argued that native ability could not be a ground for the just distribution of goods because individuals do not have an equal chance to obtain such native ability, whatever it is.¹³ If one takes “ground” to mean a fundamental moral basis, then Frankena’s conclusion is similar to those reached by Ackerman, Gutmann, and Rawls. The latter group of philosophers claim that in and of itself natural ability is a morally arbitrary attribute for distributing benefits that individuals have done nothing to deserve. Rather, one’s N.A. is merely the result of the “natural lottery” (genetic inheritance from one’s parents). Clearly, if simply true, this observation (and accompanying arguments) would tell against the sufficiency of proportionality for distributive justice. It would even seem to suggest that proportionality is not even weakly compatible with justice. If it were sufficient, then one should, it seems, hold that justice entitles one (directly) to a level of educational benefits commensurate with the level of natural ability (ceteris paribus). And if it is merely compatible, at least such a distribution is not liable to charges of injustice. But Ackerman, Gutmann, and Rawls regard a person’s native ability as morally arbitrary, and, accordingly, in and of itself an impermissible basis for distributing educational benefits. In and of itself, to allow natural ability to generate the distribution of educational benefits would be grounds for charges of injustice. (But see below.)

Frankena also seemed to write as if “ground” meant “reason.” He seemed to regard that N.A. is not a legitimate reason or criterion at any level of moral argument. But here Ackerman, Gutmann, and Rawls part company with Frankena. For they are willing to consider that in certain situations N.A. can be an indirect criterion and thus might satisfy the demands of justice. For example, if one regards N.A. as a socially useful resource, then one might be able to show that the individual and the society are better off when such native resources are developed and used wisely. In Rawls’ earlier work, he suggested that native abilities were a resource legitimately used to further the social good (and especially the relative situation of the worst off in society).¹⁴ Ackerman broadens the legitimate use of natural abilities to include indirectly benefitting the individual who is naturally gifted.¹⁵ But all three agree that one can legitimately develop one’s natural resources or can be entitled to the fruits of their use only if one can show that certain social benefits have come about. (Note that no libertarian would concede this.)

We are inclined to side with Ackerman, Gutmann, and Rawls against Frankena. Under at least some circumstances, it does not seem to be unjust to allow N.A. to generate the distribution of E.B.’s, even if by itself proportionality is an unacceptable principle of justice. The inequalities resulting from the N.A. principle might conceivably be morally justifiable as well as more or less inevitable. Therefore, we can at least ask whether it would be just in certain circumstances if the proportionality principle were satisfied.

But even here Gutmann holds that in the education of citizens the proportionality principle is morally inadequate.¹⁶ Once again she argues for threshold criteria.

Yet perhaps in other areas of the distribution above a minima, the proportionality principle is adequate and acceptable. One argument for doubting whether it is can be constructed as follows. Recall that it is empirically possible that some individuals will be overachievers and some will be underachievers (those who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunities). It is unclear what the exact size of each group is, but it seems likely that each has significant size — especially the size of the underachieving group if much anecdotal evidence about American students, at least, is to be believed. Given one’s general concern for the overall balance of individual and social good in society, would one prefer a society in which the overachievers (and underachievers) are discouraged (and/or pressured onward) so that the proportionality principle is satisfied or a society in which the overachievers and underachievers are allowed to flourish? (Remember, while we may not wish to coddle the lazy student, some motives for underachievement may be respectable, for example, the religious reasons of the Amish.) Given the very difficult task of trying to figure out what one’s native ability is, in the latter society one could just encourage everyone to go as far as they choose to try (and thereby stop focusing on determining one’s native ability). In our view the second society is, overall, preferable to first proportionality-securing society. Of course, this assumes that every society will have representative classes of overachievers and underachievers — an assumption that seems consistent with all known data concerning effort and human nature.

But this is only to raise the issue at the level of individuals. We also need to raise it the group level. Green observes, “[I]f it could be firmly established, or if it is merely believed, that a particular class, sex, or race is specially endowed with tenacity (or other good virtues), or with ability, then it would not be regarded as unjust if they benefitted disproportionately from the system.”¹⁷ This is consistent with his view that no E.B. inequalities can be regarded as unjust if they result from educationally relevant attributes of choice, tenacity, and ability. Whereas, if the system distributes E.B.’s disproportionately on the grounds of class, race, or sex (or any other social and economic criteria), then we would have grounds for claiming that the distribution is unjust (even Green concedes this in his earlier discussion). We assume that these characteristics are educationally irrelevant, and that any unequal distribution in relation to these is morally unjustifiable. But in the case that Green raises, he directly challenges that assumption. For here an educationally irrelevant attribute becomes a marker or indicator of the presence or absence of an educationally relevant attribute.

While we may grant that it is difficult to know or determine whether any class, sex, or race has any sizeable monopoly on tenacity or educational ability (whether genetically-based or acquired in the first few years of life), empirical evidence has been presented by researchers that suggests that this is true. (For one, simply consider the claims that girls are at a genetic disadvantage in math and science. Regardless of its truth, it does at least make sense of the differential performance of girls and boys. The same could be said of similar studies with regard to class and race.) But such research is so very controversial because, if true, it directly challenges our assumptions concerning just distributions in the educational system. It is not at all clear that Green is correct in claiming that we would not regard this as unjust (indeed, in his 1971 article, pp. 35 - 39 he takes very seriously the claim that this would be unjust). The controversial nature of such claims that certain groups (especially biologically defined groups such as those based on sex or race) are differentially-favored in educational ability (or in the capacity for exhibiting prudence — a capacity directly affecting choice and effort) rises in part out of our deep attachment to the notion that ability (or the capacity for exhibiting prudence) is randomly distributed among groups. While we might remain optimistic about correcting alleged handicaps due to unequal treatment within the educational system or even due to social class status, we could not remain optimistic or complacent about altering handicaps due to genetically-determined disadvantages (short of advocating morally questionable genetic engineering experimentation). We would be forced to raise the question of whether such unequal distributions due to sex or race are fair at the level of public policy rather than in mere(?) theories of justice that rarely, if ever, have any direct implications for public policy. Such claims are so controversial, then, because they are so disturbing to our moral consensus on just distributions and to the status quo of our social arrangements and institutions.

Now this is so for several reasons. Even if we agree with Ackerman, Gutmann, and Rawls that, in the abstract, ability is a morally illegitimate basis for directly distributing benefits, we still might embrace the justice of the proportionality principle at the level of public policy. Short of the very questionable morality and political impossibility of retarding the best and the brightest, the educational system simply does distribute educational benefits willy-nilly in accordance with ability (ceteris paribus). This is to say that the system simply distributes its benefits unequally between individuals. As such, we can maintain the status quo and maintain our beliefs about the legitimacy of the proportionality principle at the level of public policy, even if at the level of philosophy we regard ability to be an illegitimate direct basis for unequal distributions between individuals. In other words, we can ignore philosophy here because public policy (almost) never operates at the level of individuals, but (almost) only at the group level. Public policy is action concerning aggregates of individuals, however defined. But if we are able to establish that educational ability is non-randomly distributed between groups, that fact is something that the polity for public policy cannot ignore. The establishment of that fact would compel the polity to seriously raise and deal with the justice of the proportionality principle. And it is here that the full force of the philosophical arguments concerning the use of ability would come in to play. If we are right in thinking that those philosophical arguments are ultimately compelling, we would have no choice but to regard the proportionality principle as an illegitimate principle for distributing the system’s benefits.

But strangely, even this demonstration of injustice in the system may not cause us to abandon the use of ability for distributing educational benefits. For there is a sense in which the educational system cannot help but distribute its benefits in relation to ability (Green makes a similar point ).¹⁸ Even if we were to somehow equalize group outcomes, it is difficult to see how we might move away from the dynamics of ability at the individual level within groups. The dynamics of educational ability simply seems to be a feature of the educational system that we cannot eradicate. Thus, we may simply be forced to admit that the system, like life, is unfair. We may simply have to live with that basic unfairness in the educational system.

But this does not mean that we can simply wash our hands of social injustice made manifest and walk away. Indeed, there are a number of small and large steps that policy makers might take to mitigate the consequences of inequitable educational achievement between groups (and indirectly between individuals). Subject, of course, to the certain observation that we cannot jointly maximize all (or even most) desirable goods and ideals. (1) We might reexamine, once more, the distribution of resources within the educational system so that the least advantaged are lavished with the most resources. (2) We might question whether the distribution of social and economic benefits should be so closely linked to the distribution of educational benefits. (3) We might attempt to implement Rawls’ “difference principle” (or Ackerman’s weaker version of it) so that inequalities in the distribution of educational and social and economic benefits due to the genetic lottery can be shown to be justifiable insofar as they clearly raise the welfare of the least advantaged higher than their level of welfare expected in a purely egalitarian society. Which one policy, or combination of such policies, is the most appropriate to pursue awaits the recognition that the proportionality principle is simply unjustified, irrespective of any determination of group inequalities in ability. Philosophy cannot predict when, if ever, that recognition will come. Philosophy can only hope to establish that, in the main, the current arrangements are just or unjust. But that is no mean feat.

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¹ The authors share equal responsibility for this paper.

² Thomas F. Green (with David P. Ericson and Robert H. Seidman), Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980), 37-40.

³ James S. Coleman, “Responsibility of the Schools in the Provision of Equal Educational Opportunity,” in Education for Whom?, eds. C.A. Tesconi, Jr. and E. Hurwik (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1974), 100-107.

⁴ See James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990).

⁵ Thomas F Green, “Equal Educational Opportunity: The Durable Injustice,” reprinted in Tesconi and Hurwitz, eds. (cited above), 78-100. The views expressed in this article are given more extensive treatment in Green’s “The Dismal Future of Equal Educational Opportunity,” in Educational Planning in Perspective, ed. Thomas F. Green (Guilford, Surrey, England: Futures, IPC Science and Technology Press, 1971), 24-39.

⁶ Thomas F. Green, “The Dismal Future,” 25-26, 30. In Green, “Equal Educational Opportunity,” the impression is sometimes given that he embraces the positive claim that it would be just for the educational system to distribute educational benefits proportionately with native ability. The 1971 paper shows that he accepts only the negative formulation. See also Predictina, 50.

⁷ Green, “The Dismal Future,” 30.

⁸ Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1987).

⁹ Amy Gutmann, personal communication, 1990. See her Democratic Education (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987).

¹⁰ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971) and “The Priority of the Right and Ideas of the Good,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 4 (1988): 251-276 .

¹¹ Green, “The Dismal Future,” 26 and Predictina, 50.

¹² Gutmann, Democratic Education.

¹³ William Frankena, Ethics, 2nd ed., (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

¹⁴ Rawls, A Theory of Justice.

¹⁵ Ackerman, Social Justice.

¹⁶ Gutmann, Democratic Education. Green discusses this kind of view in “The Dismal Future,” 38.

¹⁷ Green, Predicting, 50.

¹⁸ Green, “The Dismal Future.”