THE JUSTIFICATION OF CRITICAL THINKING:
A RESPONSE TO MCCARTHY

John McPeck
University of Western Ontario

I

Christine McCarthy is correct to distinguish between the “episodic” and “dispositional” senses of the phrase “critical thinking”. Moreover, she is correct to point out that Siegel and myself run together these two senses of the phrase in our respective definitions of “critical thinking” (CT). We are both guilty as charged. What our stated definitions have run together is a description of the critical thinker qua person, and a description of critical thinking qua cognitive process.

I do, in fact, collapse this distinction far too often, and I apologize for the confusion this sloppiness has caused some readers, especially Dr. McCarthy. In the end, however, I do not think that this amounts to much more than a stylistic slip, of sorts, because more often than not, throughout the text, I, too, distinguish between the person (with dispositions), and the knowledge and skills which make up critical thinking. In addition, my general position on the subject-specific character of CT, and its non-generalizability, rests upon this distinction. In this regard, Anthony Flew criticized my book for having made the distinction between dispositions and skills too sharp, saying that it was a bit like “teaching someone what good table manners are, and then allowing them to eat like Henry the VIII.”¹

Thus, I share Dr. McCarthy’s concern for distinguishing between the disposition for CT and episodic acts of CT. Moreover, I agree with many of the points she goes on to make in relation to the consequences of failing to make this distinction, particularly her point about the danger of “indoctrination” when a disposition is our pedagogical desideratum. This is an important and interesting point because who would have thought that our endeavour to promote CT might come dangerously close to indoctrination — of all things.

II

There are a few points in McCarthy’s paper about which I am less sanguine, however. One minor point concerns her critique of Siegel’s analytic or “self-justifying” argument, which he employs for the justification of CT. McCarthy argues that, contra Siegel, CT can and should be justified on straightforward instrumental grounds, and not on analytic or conceptual grounds. I see no real tension here, however. McCarthy’s instrumental justification of CT does not gainsay Siegel’s more analytical justification. There are many things that can be justified in several different ways. For example, health, and a clean environment, could each be justified on conceptual or analytic grounds as well as instrumental ones. Similarly, CT could be justified in either or both of these ways.

III

One of the major criticisms that I have of McCarthy’s paper, however, is that it actually fails in its endeavour to provide the promised “instrumental justification” for critical thinking. While her argument for an instrumental justification is anything but straightforward, winding as it does through many pages with several other points thrown in, I will try to recapture the logic of her argument as succinctly and as fairly as I can.

You will recall that her attempted instrumental justification of CT employs an analogy with “Careful Rock-Climbing.” Briefly, the analogy is as follows: there is rock-climbing; there is thinking; and as there is careful rock-climbing, there is critical thinking. She continues:

Suppose that it were proposed to add to one’s curriculum a required course in Careful Rock-Climbing. The question, “Why should one learn to rock-climb carefully?” would probably not arise, although the question, “Why should one learn to rock-climb at all?” very will might.²

Thus, the argument continues, if one accepts that rock-climbing is worthwhile (one of course, need not), then it becomes easy to justify “careful rock-climbing”. But, alas, as McCarthy correctly points out, it remains a contingent proposition whether one should “get into” rock-climbing in the first place. But here, McCarthy argues, is where “thinking” is crucially different from rock-climbing. She goes on:

First, thinking seems to be something we cannot help but to do (although sometimes, admittedly, to little effect.) But second, and more importantly, it would seem that in most situations thinking is regarded as unquestionably useful — it helps one to solve existing problems, to predict and avoid problems….³

Thus, her argument suggests, while one might easily reject rock-climbing as useful or worthwhile, one cannot so easily reject thinking as useful or worthwhile. Hence, we have the (putative!) “instrumental justification” of thinking; and later, by extension, critical thinking.

If this is a fair sketch or interpretation of the argument given let us look at it more carefully. In particular, consider the two reasons given to show how thinking is different from rock-climbing. “First, thinking seems to be something we cannot help but to do….” If this is, indeed, true, namely that we cannot help but think, then it is true by virtue of the kinds of beings that we are, but not for any contingent reasons. That is, “thinking” would not be merely “efficacious” or “instrumental” but rather necessary, because that is what humans most do. The necessity here is like that which is embedded in the proposition “humans think.” This is arguably an analytic proposition. In any case, the nature of the connection between us (humans) and thinking is not simply an “instrumental” one. Thus, while thinking is crucially different from rock-climbing, its difference does not preserve the instrumental connection required by McCarthy’s argument.

Consider the second reason, or second difference from rock-climbing: “[S]econd, and more importantly, it would seem that in most situations thinking is regarded as unquestionably useful — it helps one to solve existing problems….” (Italics are mine) Notice, however, that it is simply not true that all thinking is “useful.” Some thinking, in fact, can be harmful to us, such as thinking about having a smoke, or taking drugs; or suicide; excessive worrying; paranoid thoughts (“The Mafia is after me!”); thinking during your back-swing in golf — not to mention false thinking, vague thinking, and the like.

To be fair, however, McCarthy does not actually say that all thinking is useful, rather, she has a “hedge” qualification here which claims instead that thinking is unquestionably useful in “most situations.” Well, one might ask, which situations are these? One might also point out that while it is not always useful to rock-climb, similarly, sometimes it is. Thus, we might equally ask of rock-climbing: which situations are these? The most general answer to both of these questions is “These things are unquestionably useful when the situation calls for it.” No one, presumably, could know, or possibly anticipate, what all these situations might be. In effect, then, they turn out to be useful in just those situations where they are, or would be, useful. Contrary to appearances, this is not an “instrumental justification” of thinking, but rather a tautological one. The putative usefulness of thinking, construed in this way, is no longer contingent but necessary.

IV

Finally, I should also comment upon Dr. McCarthy’s view that “[C]ritical thinking is a necessary condition of rationality.”4 This view, at least, has the virtue of being different from Siegel’s, which contends that CT and rationality are co-extensive; and it is also different from my view which holds that these necessary conditions are in exactly the reverse order (i.e., I claim that rationality is a necessary condition of CT.). I would point out that to hold the view that “CT is a necessary condition of rationality”, as McCarthy does, issues in two very awkward consequences. The first is this. Since CT would include rationality as a logical sub-set of CT, there must be cases of critical thinking which are not rational. But such cases, I must confess, are impossible for me to imagine. I simply cannot conceive of cases of bona fide critical thinking which are not also rational. I take it that this is precisely the reason why Siegel opts for viewing the two as co-extensive — and why this awkward consequence does not arise for him.

The second awkward consequence of McCarthy’s view is one which Siegel must, alas, also live with, namely: both are forced to deny that there are cases of rationality which do not employ critical thinking. I call this an “awkward consequence” of their view because it seems to me to be “patently false.” Since I have argued this point before with Siegel, I won’t retrace all these steps again except to point to some examples which I think show that not all rational acts employ critical thinking. Such rational acts would include relying on a calculator, brushing one’s teeth, following a stranger’s street directions when lost in a city, etc. Such examples clearly show that critical thinking is not a necessary condition of rationality.

---

¹ Anthony Flew, “Review of ‘Critical Thinking and Education’,” British Journal of Educational Studies 30, no. 3 (1982): 352-353.

² Christine McCarthy, “Why be Critical? (or Rational or Moral?) The Justification of Critical Thinking,” in Philosophy of Education 1992, ed. H.A. Alexander (Champaign, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1993).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.