2. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 244. Ak. 6: 450. Kant's emphasis.

3. Commentators disagree about the extent of the latitude Kant intends in the fulfillment of imperfect duties. Mary Gregor distinguishes between the "rigoristic" view, according to which the agent is bound to do as much as possible in the way of helping others, and the "non-rigoristic" view, according to which the extent of the agent's obligation to help is entirely arbitrary, that is, the agent may always refuse to help others on merely subjective grounds. Gregor herself defends the non-rigoristic view. See Mary Gregor, Laws of Freedom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), chap. 7.

4. Gregor, "Introduction," in Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 25.

5. Kant also claims that we have an indirect duty to guard against the vices contrary to the duty of love - envy, ingratitude, and malice. See Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 251-54. Ak. 6: 458-62.

6. Ibid., 250-51. Ak. 6: 457.

7. Ibid., 250. Ak. 6: 456-57.

8. Regarding the feeling of moral or practical love, Kant writes: "Beneficence is a duty. If someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped. So the saying "you ought to love your neighbor as yourself" does not mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, do good to your fellow man, and your beneficence will produce love of man in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general)." Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 203. Ak. 6: 402. I assume that these comments would apply to moral or practical sympathy as well.

9. Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. Mary Gregor (1789; reprint, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), 104. Ak. 7: 236.

10. Ibid.

11. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 199.

12. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 251. Ak. 6: 457.

13. Immanuel Kant, On Education, trans. Annette Churton (Bristol, U.K.: Thoemmes, 1992), 97-98. Ak. 9: 487.

14. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 251, Ak. 6: 457.

15. Henry Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 167.

16. There are other places in the corpus of Kant's work that might be taken to suggest that a view close to Allison's is correct. Consider a passage from Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans. John Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 60: "In view of the weakness of human nature and of the little force which the universal moral feeling would exercise over most hearts, Providence has placed in us as supplements to virtue assisting drives....Sympathy and complaisance are grounds of beautiful deeds, which would perhaps be altogether suppressed by the preponderance of a coarser selfishness," Ak. 2: 217. Consider also a passage from the later work "End of All Things" in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 101: "then is love, as the free integration of the will of another into one's maxims, an indispensable addition to human nature's imperfection....For what one does not do gladly he does so grudgingly - even to the point of sophistical pretext to avoid duty's command - that this incentive [of duty] cannot be counted on to any great degree unless the command is accompanied by love." Ak. 8: 338.

17. Kant explains his notion of a morally impure will most clearly in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore Greene and Hoyt Hudson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 25: "the impurity...of the human heart consists in this, that although the maxim is indeed good in respect of its object (the intended observance of the law) and perhaps even strong enough for practice, it is yet not purely moral; that is, it has not, as it should have, adopted the law alone as its all-sufficient incentive: instead, it usually (perhaps, every time) stands in need of other incentives beyond this, in determining the will to do what duty demands; in other words, actions called for by duty are done not purely for duty's sake." Ak. 6: 29-30.