| PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 1997 |
Gender-Sensitive Education and Justice
Allen T. Pearson
University of Western Ontario
The Gender Question in Education: Theory, Pedagogy and Politics is a persuasive and compelling series of essays on sexism and education. The authors, through a series of essays brought together in this volume, contribute important insights to our understanding of this important issue in education. Although the essays are by different authors and written over a number of years, they read very much as a piece. A central argument in the book is a defence of "gender-sensitive" education. To approach my task of providing a response in a limited space, I have chosen to take one issue raised by my reading of the book and explore it. By doing this, I will of course miss or ignore many, indeed most, of the valuable points the authors make. I do hope that my considerations will speak to an important issue and that in doing so I may contribute to the dialogue started by the authors.I take my starting point from Morgan: "I claim that a social policy of gender-freedom gives equality and justice pride of place alongside liberty and self-determination" (p. 45). The question I want to pose is whether the ideal of gender-sensitivity promotes justice. Now, I will have to be brief dealing with some major points. The first, obviously, is justice. As a way to get to my issue, consider one well-known position on justice, that of John Rawls. Susan Moller Okin has argued that "the feminist potential of Rawls's method of thinking and his conclusions is considerable. The original position, with the veil of ignorance hiding from its participants their sex as well as their other particular characteristics, talents, circumstances, and aims, is a powerful concept for challenging the gender structure."[1] Recognizing the deeply gendered nature of Rawls's work, Moller Okin nonetheless argues that his theory gives us tools for getting at the question of justice. The original position asks us to consider what principles we would choose to live by if we did not know the particular circumstances we might enjoy in life. Without going any further into this position, it is eminently plausible that if gender is added to the consideration, a sexist society is not one that would be allowed to be just. Quite simply, if we had the power to set the moral conditions and principles of justice in a society when we were in a position not to know the talents or characteristics or gender we might enjoy as persons we certainly would not choose a society that gave differential positions of power and influence on the basis of gender. The Rawlsian position on justice can thereby be used to show that a sexist society is an unjust one. But since the original position is one in which people are behind the "veil of ignorance," it seems to require that a just society is a gender-free society.
I think that this result is independent of the choice of theories of justice. Whether we choose Rawls or some other position as our theoretical framework, we will find that a sexist society is not a just society. This is because a sexist society is one in which people are not accorded equal respect and consideration. As Will Kymlicka argues, "the fundamental agreement [in political theory] is not whether to accept equality as a value, but how best to interpret it."[2] What unites the variety of theories of justice available to us is their commitment to the equal treatment of persons. Since a sexist society denies equal treatment on the basis of gender, any theory of justice ought to lead to the same conclusion. Rawls, then, is just one example of this conclusion.
In principle, then, there are strong reasons for advocating a gender-free society. This position has to be weighed against Houston's argument that a gender-free approach to education "would likely ensure that females continue to have unequal educational opportunity" (p. 51). The apparent contradiction here can be addressed by noting that the comparison is between a gender-free society and gender-free education. If gender-free education were to be introduced in a society ordered by genderized or patriarchal principles, it would seem that Houston is absolutely right in her claim. If education were to treat gender as a category that made no difference in a society where it does make a difference, our efforts to create a just society are likely doomed to failure in that there would be no social reinforcement for our efforts in education. So, Houston's argument in this chapter strikes me as being absolutely correct. Through careful analysis and drawing upon research and practice she shows convincingly, to me at least, that gender-free education is not likely to produce the social change that is needed. She goes on in this chapter to call for gender-sensitive education. It is the relation between gender-sensitive education and Morgan's basic call for justice that I now want to pursue briefly.
As stated earlier, gender-sensitive education is a theme that runs throughout the book. Diller captures gender-sensitive education as an approach to education "where one recognizes the likelihood of crucial gender differences, watches for these, notices their effects and adapts educational practices accordingly" (p. 100). A gender-sensitive approach to education thereby is not one that assumes that gender does not exist or does not matter. Rather, education ought to take into account gender differences and change practices so as to recognize such differences. There are of course a multitude of ways in which educational practice can be modified so as to be sensitive to gender. Single sex classrooms or schools can be arranged so as to provide females with learning environments that promote the highest possible success and participation. Teaching strategies can be modified to allow for greater participation by female students. Activities that are genderized in society can be taught to both boys and girls. To use Jane Martin's distinction, female students can be introduced to the productive activities of society and male students to the reproductive activities.
Suppose we are successful in developing a gender-sensitive approach to education. Will we be instituting an approach that is just? To answer this question in detail might require us to examine the issue from the vantage points of several theories of justice. More importantly, we would have to examine specific gender-sensitive approaches and cases. Questions of justice are answered by examining particular policies and practices. But perhaps some insight can be gained by looking at the question in general. To get a feel for the issues involved let us consider the case from the viewpoint that Moller Okin uses, referred to earlier. Suppose we were in the original position behind the veil of ignorance and hence with no knowledge of our characteristics (including gender) and talents and were to ask ourselves whether a gender-sensitive approach to education would be one that we would choose. It would seem that the choice would not be automatic. If gender-sensitive education is instituted in a society that accords differential respect and power on the basis of gender, some people will remain disadvantaged because of gender. So, from behind the veil of ignorance a gender-sensitive approach to education requires a gender-free society, a society in which one's gender does not affect a person's claim to equal treatment and respect. Again, it is apparent that a fundamental commitment to equality is necessary in a society before schools can make a difference with respect to gender and sexism.
Once again the centrality of equality to approaches to education to deal with gender issues is revealed. Morgan is correct, then, in claiming that a social policy of gender-freedom gives pride of place to equality and justice. In the absence of such a social policy and commitment it seems questionable that gender-sensitive approaches to education will be themselves be sufficient to bring about a nonsexist society. But they may well be crucial steps in achieving this goal. By making changes to practice in light of gender differences and by treating such differences with respect, we are making the first steps in the needed social changes. By helping students become sensitive to gender we allow them to see the inequities that exist. To solve a problem one first needs to see that there is a problem.
So my considerations do not lead to a rejection of gender-sensitive approaches. But I think I may have recast them as a means to an end, rather than approaches of inherent value. This arises, I think, from the differences, and tensions, between gender-free and gender-sensitive education. However these differences are worked out, what must be fundamental is our pursuit of justice.
[1]. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (Basic Books, 1986), 108-9. Emphasis in the original.[2] Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 5.