THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS
OF AN ALTERNATIVE VISION
Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon
Northwestern University
A cardinal preoccupation of the current educational reform movement is that of “teaching people to think.” This is a phrase that John Dewey popularized,1 and many since his time have urged its importance.2 Yet, exactly what “thinking” means and what teaching thinking should entail remains in question.
My book, Turning the Soul: Teaching Through Conversation in the High School (Chicago: 1991), suggests a vision of thinking that builds upon Dewey’s notion of “reflective thinking,” although it may differ from Dewey’s idea in certain respects. It is a vision that has roots in the philosophies of Plato, Wittgenstein, and Gadamer. It is a also a vision which, I believe, has significant implication for the construction of the curriculum and the preparation of teachers. In the present paper, I articulate some features of the vision, beginning with a focus upon its philosophical foundations. In concluding, I defend my superimposition3 of philosophies and comment briefly upon implications for educational reform.
The use of the word “thinking” that I shall present has roots in three philosophical traditions, the combining of elements from which may appear problematic, if not impossible. The first of these might be called the “mental events” tradition. Accordingly, the word “thinking” is used with reference to activities carried out “in the heads” of human beings4 and so, carried out in isolation. The mental events that go on “in the head” when one is said to be “thinking” may posit relations among ideas, objects or objects and characteristics. Plato, at least in some places, seems to take “thinking” to mean “learning” or “recollecting,”5 that is, drawing out one’s “knowledge” by relating experience to ideals or what he sometimes called “Forms.”6 Much later, Kant,7 and Brentano, like others in the mental events tradition, maintained that “thinking” is deliberative reflection about some “object,” in the mind,8 and again, the assumption is that it is carried out as a series of mental events experienced solo.9
A second tradition of the use of the word “thinking “is implicit in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations10 and explicit in Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind11 — what one might call the ordinary language tradition. Wittgenstein suggests his view in the following cryptic footnote to section 151:
“Understanding a word”: a state. But a mental state? — Depression, excitement, pain, are called mental states. Carry out a grammatical investigation as follows: we say “He was depressed the whole day.” “He was in great excitement the whole day.” “He has been in continuous pain since yesterday.” — We also say, “Since yesterday I have understood this word.” “Continuously,” though? —To be sure, one can speak of an interruption of understanding. But in what cases? Compare: “When did your pains get less?” and “When did you stop understanding that word?”When Wittgenstein asks us to compare the last two phrases, he seems to suggest that the first makes sense to say but the second somehow does not. This conclusion is furthered by the preceding sentences, which seem to refer to mental states (depression, excitement, continuous pain) — states that have temporal duration, and as such, are amenable to measurement. To ask for the duration in the last instance seems inappropriate, which suggests that “understanding a word” is not a mental state.
If “understanding” does not refer to a mental state, or need not be thought of as a mental state, then do “knowing” and “thinking? Again, Wittgenstein seems to respond negatively. But in reference to what, according to Wittgenstein, is one to use these terms? To “know” he says, is to be “master of a technique,”12 that is, to be able to use or to do something in a given context. One knows the formula for generating a series of numbers if one can generate the numbers that belong in the series in proper order.13 And the decision that X “knows” the formula is made on the basis of whether his/her actions meet the criteria. Of no interest whatsoever are the mental events that may have transpired “in X’s head” after the problem was given.
The term “thinking,” according to Wittgenstein, would be used with reference to people playing a language game (or language games) of a certain sort. To play the game requires one to follow its rules and act accordingly. The rules have been agreed upon by the community of language users so that what counts as knowing the rules and playing the game is agreed upon and recognized by all the members of the community.
Yet, a third tradition of use of the word “thinking” — call it the postmodern — is explored by Gadamer in Truth and Method.14 Gadamer puts questioning at the center of experience and hence, of thinking:
It is clear that the structure of the question is implicit in all experience. We cannot have experiences without asking questions. The recognition that an object is different and not as we first thought, obviously involves the question whether it was this or that….To ask a question means to bring into the open. The openness of what is in question consists in the fact that the answer is not settled….The asking of it implies openness, but also limitation. It implies the explicit establishing of presuppositions in terms of which can be seen what still remains open.15When Gadamer says that “the structure of the question is implicit in all experience,” he seems to mean that to have an “experience” is to discover what is, or perhaps what seems to be the case — a discovery which logically presupposes the possibility that it might have been otherwise. When we “recognize” that an object is not what we first thought it to be, we make explicit the existence of the question about what the object might be; the question was implicit, or unasked, until that point. If the doorbell rings, I answer it, and it turns out to be my mother (who lives across the country) rather than the neighbor I was expecting, then I recognize the existence of the question about who might have been at the door.
Likewise, posing a question presupposes limitations on that which is or is thought to be, such that something remains open and so, may be questioned. If, upon hearing the doorbell, I ask myself whether it is my neighbor whom I am expecting, I presuppose that I have indeed heard the doorbell and not merely imagined it ringing. I also presuppose that the doorbell is working properly (not ringing randomly, for example.) To pose a question, then, is to accept some conditions as given in light of which questions may be posed.
Now, the use of the word “thinking” I wish to propose draws elements from all three of the traditions sketched above. I suggest, then, that “thinking” may refer to reflective thinking about meaning. Dewey16 long ago spoke of “thinking” as “reflective thinking,” and in so doing, he was referring to activities involved in recognizing a problematic situation, observing the conditions of the situation, defining the problem so as to suggest a solution, following the course of action prescribed by the solution, and assessing the result of so doing. For Dewey, reflective thinking was what others have called “following the scientific method.”17 Furthermore, as Dewey presents it, reflective thinking, or “thinking” as he understood the term, involved discovering what is already there but previously unrecognized. Dewey writes:
The educational conclusion which follows is that all thinking is original in a projection of considerations which have not been previously apprehended. The child of three who discovers what can be done with blocks, or of six who finds out what he can make by putting five cents and five cents together, is really a discoverer, even though everybody else in the world knows it.18Now, this characterization of thinking suggests the presence of an ambiguity: Is the “thinking” toward which Dewey points a series of mental events taking place “in the head”? Clearly there is overt action involved in the procedure he outlines: both children mentioned in the quotation are manipulating objects (blocks, five cents and five cents). But, the three-year-old who “discovers what can be done with blocks,” for example, comes to a recognition of that which is there to be discovered, a recognition made possible by acting and perhaps drawing conclusions “in the head” as to the consequences of the action.19
The ambiguity which Dewey’s concept of reflective thinking may encounter disappears if, in the spirit of Wittgenstein, one uses the term “thinking” to refer to the activity or language game of conversing about meaning — an activity that goes on between those in a community of language users. In this instance, the participants in the group would be said to be “thinking” not because there are particular mental events taking place in their heads,20 but because they are saying things about the meaning to which others in the conversation listen and respond.
If the term “thinking” is said to refer to the activity of21 conversing about meaning, however, then one wants to say that the outcome of thinking is the creation, not the discovery of meaning, as Dewey suggests. “Thinking,” or what I wish to call reflective thinking about meaning, results in a creation — a creation that arises though the conversation and depends upon the ways in which words are used by participants. What is said about the conditions or “text”22 in question in the conversation, and hence the meaning that is created, depends upon the practices for using language that the members of the group follow.
Gadamer’s perspective allows further refinement of my use of the term “thinking.” Not only can the word refer to the creation of meaning by individuals in a language game who are talking about given conditions (some text), but the creation can be seen to proceed by forming questions — uncovering what people believe to be the case about a text, and in so doing, raising questions which presuppose the existence of certain conditions so that others are open to what is called investigation.23 “Meaning” is created as people talk together about a text using words in particular ways which are accepted or rejected. Thinking, that is, reflective thinking about meaning, involves people in a conversation coming to agreements about the features of the text and simultaneously opening new questions about the text’s features.
As an illustration, consider the following excerpt form Turning the Soul, in which discussants have raised the question of how Romeo and Juliet are to find happiness. SHG is the discussion leader.
SHG: So you are saying, Colette, that if he [Romeo] sneaked off and married her [Juliet] they [the Montague and/or Capulet families] would really come after him, right? So instead of being safe and being able to get away [as James had suggested previously], they [the lovers] would be in more trouble?The issue that James and Colette have focused upon is this: would Romeo and Juliet be better off if they eloped secretly or not? James has argued in the affirmative, saying that, once married, they would then be free to do as they wished. Arguing on the basis of an imagined father’s response, Colette maintains that the marriage would prompt Capulet to kill Romeo. One begins to see how the discussants are listening and responding to each other, according to discussion procedures, and in so doing, establishing facts, raising questions, and so, creating more ideas about the meaning of the play. Let’s observe a little more of the conversation:
Colette: I don’t know.
SHG: Is this a good idea that Romeo and Juliet have here, [to marry secretly], Colette?
Sylvia: Yes.
James: Maybe to them, but not to others.
SHG: Why is it a good idea to them, James?
James: Because they are in love.
SHG: If they are in love and trying to get away, is this a smart thing to do? You were saying [previously] that for them it is because they will be free, right, James? Even with everybody chasing them and everything?
James: They won’t have to answer to anybody.
SHG: I see, so they can do what they want. They will be free. But what are you saying, Colette?
Colette: If somebody took my daughter and ran off and got married, I would kill him!24
SHG: You would kill him, Colette? So you don’t think that this plan of sneaking off to get married is a good idea? You think they are going to be in more trouble doing it this way? What would you suggest that they do in this situation?Here we see the discussants establishing conditions and at the same time, raising questions: If, as Colette argues, it is inadvisable for Romeo and Juliet to elope, given Lord Capulet’s potential response, the question then arises, what should they do instead? Colette responds that the lovers should “tell someone.” But tell Lord Capulet? and if so, when? Before or after the marriage? James begins by responding that Juliet’s father would be less distressed to be told before the marriage, but then seems to shift his view, exclaiming that “Anyway it goes is bad.” So a satisfactory alternative to elopement has yet to be identified.
Colette: I think they should tell someone.
SHG: Should Juliet go to her father and say: Hey, I’m not interested in Paris, but there is someone else I am interested in?
Colette: Yeah! He can’t do nothing!
Marcy: Just because he couldn’t stop them anyway.
James: He could stop them, but he probably has someone else to stop them. But, I think he will be very upset with her if she tells him.
SHG: Would the father be more upset to know before or after the marriage?
James: After.
SHG: You say “after,” James? Why?
James: They were talking to her before. Plus, eating, he would spit out his food at her.
SHG: So that is what happens if she tells him before, right? What about if she tells him afterward? What would he do, James?
James: He would be bent out of shape!
Colette: Uh-uh, he would kill Romeo for marrying his daughter.
SHG: James, I am still not sure what you are saying. Would it be worse if she told her father before or after the marriage?
James: Anyway it goes is bad.25
The foregoing is an example of what I call reflective thinking about meaning — thinking which creates meaning as the conversation proceeds. The meaning that has been created is the realization that Romeo and Juliet face a very pressing dilemma — one not easily resolved. If they elope, they will be pursued. If they disclose their actions or intentions, they will be inhibited from finding the happiness they seek, given the tension that exists between the Montagues and Capulets.
I have said that the term “thinking” is to refer to reflective thinking that occurs when people converse about the meaning of some text according to accepted rules. The meaning that the text comes to have in the discussion is created rather than discovered, as the meaning comes to be when discussants establish some conditions as existing within the text and open others to question. The discussants are said to be “thinking” when their comments build upon one another according to rules and practices of interpretive discussion, as did those of James, Colette, and others in the excerpts presented. It may be that if questioned about their thoughts, discussants could describe images or other mental events that transpired “in their heads” as the conversation proceeded. But in the present context, the claim that discussant X is “thinking” is made on the basis of his/her remarks in relation to those of others rather than inferences about mental events.26
Exactly how remarks in conversations about meaning conform to rules and construct meaning is a topic for another occasion. At present, let us consider one objection that might be raised, namely, the appropriateness of superimposing philosophical traditions as has been done here. Is it justifiable to stipulate a definition of thinking that joins the mental events, ordinary language, and post-modern traditions as suggested above?
My response is that the superimposition is justified, and for two reasons. First, it does not violate the assumptions of one tradition to superimpose it upon the others as has been done here. Second, doing so generates a definition of the term “thinking” that can contribute to educational reform. The latter claim cannot be defended in detail here, although I will offer brief support for it. The first point is more readily addressed.
The use of the word “thinking” presented above starts with Dewey’s phrase “reflective thinking” and rests upon certain tenets of the ordinary language tradition to which are appended insights derived from Plato and Gadamer. To stipulate that the word “thinking” refers to the reflective thinking taking place when members of a community converse about the meaning of a text means that the word “thinking” refers to the activity of individuals. It does not refer to a sequence of mental events. The meaning of the text for that group is created as the discussants follow rules for responding to one another that are accepted by the members of the community. Following the rules may be said to “draw out” of participants ideas about the meaning of the text, much as Socrates, in questioning the slave, appears to “draw out” his ideas about the geometry problem. What is “drawn out” is not assumed to be “already there,” in the sense that it was created in some previous incarnation and sits ready to be called upon. But, the participants’ remarks, which might be said to express their ideas and which proffer agreement, disagreement, or raise questions, draw upon previously acquired understanding as it is aroused by the conversation and the text under discussion. As Gadamer has noted, the conversation proceeds by making assertions and posing questions — questions that presuppose agreement upon certain points. So, the understanding of the text that is created though the conversation consists of a series of agreements and questions which are gradually cultivated.
Now, if we stipulate that the term “thinking” does not refer to the sequence of mental events that transpire “in the head,” then we locate the referent of the term “thinking” outside of that fixed upon by the mental events tradition. But, having done so, are we entitled to speak of discussants “having ideas” or “having questions,” as would be the inclination when observing a group conversation? Furthermore, is it consistent to say that the conversation “draws out participants’ understanding?” Or that the discussants “cultivate questions?” All of these phrases seem to presuppose that the “thinking” that the discussants do is going on “in the head,” and that it corresponds to a series of mental events.
Let us be perfectly clear. There may be mental events transpiring — images or ideas that “flash” into the mind, for example — as discussants engage in conversation; but to say the discussants are “thinking,” given the stipulated definition, says nothing about these events. If we, as observers, wish to say that discussant X “had an idea, namely Y,” it is because certain conditions obtain, so that we wish to make such a claim. Perhaps X makes the statement Y; perhaps X says something else that makes us say “she had Y in mind.” There is nothing in the use of the word “thinking” stipulated here that prevents us from talking about people “having minds,” or “having ideas” or “having questions.” In using such mentalistic expressions as “she believes that,” or “she wonders whether,” we mean that the comments a speaker makes incline us to describe her in certain ways. For in describing a speaker as “believing that,” we, as observers, are playing a language game. And the speaker’s comments establish the conditions from within which our descriptions are given. In summary, use of the term “thinking,” given the stipulated definition, is grounded in statements that are made in a conversation — statements which establish the conditions under which an observer makes claims about the discussants. To say that a discussant X is “thinking” or “has the idea of Y in mind” refers not to events literally in the mind of X but to conditions created by the statements X makes and their relation to the statements of others.
In conclusion, a word about educational reform. The use of the word “thinking” suggested here has implications for reform in classrooms and teacher preparation programs. By assuming that “thinking” refers to reflective thinking about meaning that occurs in conversation about texts, the teacher shifts her focus from preparing lectures and demonstrations to creating opportunities for such conversations. The teacher is concerned to identify suitable texts for discussion and to develop ways of helping students to question the texts and listen to others so as to create meaning. There are many learning activities that support the formation of skills cultivated through discussion, such as writing and rewriting questions about the texts before and after the conversations,27 conducting research aimed at resolving questions that arise, writing responses to questions upon which other students comment, and identifying additional texts that may broaden the interests that have begun to flower. These activities might not so naturally occur in classrooms that feature lecture and demonstration.
Furthermore, the preparation of teachers would focus upon developing the skills of question preparation, discussion facilitation, and integration of text analysis into all areas of the curriculum — a particularly tall order in the areas of science and mathematics.28 To take seriously the use of the word “thinking” offered here, then, may involve modification of the activities that are typically found in classrooms and teacher preparation programs today.
For a
response to this essay, see McCarty.
1. John Dewey, How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process, New Edition (Boston: Heath, 1933), particularly chapter seven.
2. For example, recently, the Philosophy for Children Program, Gareth B. Matthews, Philosophy and the Young Child (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); and The Paideia Project, M. J. Adler, Reforming Education: The Opening of the American Mind, ed. A. Van Doren (New York: Macmillan, 1988).
3. By “superimposition,” I mean the eclectic combining of features which, traditionally, may be found uncombined in different philosophical traditions.
4. Jane Goodall, for example, In the Shadow of Man (San Diego: San Diego State University Press, 1988), might maintain that chimpanzees also “think,” given the definition.
5. Plato, Meno, in Collected Dialogues, ed., E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), 85d.
6. Plato, Republic, in Collected Dialogues, for example, 510c-511d; Phaedo, 100b-101b. Even in Sophist 263d, where Plato states that “thinking and discourse are the same thing, except that what we call thinking is precisely the inward dialogue carried on by the mind with itself,” there is presupposed a sequence of mental events in which one’s knowledge is drawn out. Forms, however, are not mentioned in the Sophist, as is the case in other “later” dialogues. Plato’s vision of thinking may have shifted from the “middle” period dialogues, which include Republic, Meno, and Phaedo.
7. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), Introduction.
8. As argued by Franz Brentano, Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint, ed. O. Kraus, trans. A. C. Rancurello et al, (New York: Humanities Press, 1973).
9. A variation, yet still in the mental events tradition, is to be found in the works of Sigmund Freud (for example, Chapter VII, The Interpretation of Dreams, ed. J. Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953)), who like Plato and Kant, assumed that thought was carried out in isolation from others and in the head. But, maintained Freud, thinking need not be a series of conscious mental events. Indeed, the most powerful thinking does not occur at a conscious level at all.
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd. ed., trans. G .E. M. Anscombe (New York: Basil, Blackwell, & Mott, 1958).
11. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
12. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Part I: 150.
13. Ibid., Part I: 151.
14. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd ed., trans. Sheed and Ward, Ltd. (New York; Crossroads Publishing Company, 1985).
15. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 325-27.
16. Dewey, How We Think, particularly chapter VII.
17. For example, Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, 2nd Edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 1979).
18. John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education (New York: Free Press, 1966), 159.
19. It might be maintained that Dewey, as a pragmatist, asserts that thinking takes place in the context of activity and not “in the head.” This may indeed be Dewey’s position, as it seems to be in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1938), for example, 28-31. However, the ambiguity identified above suggests that Dewey’s view on the matter is somewhat inconsistent.
20. Of course, images and ideas may indeed arise “in the heads” of the participants, but the word “thinking” is not used here in reference to these mental events.
21. I avoid the word “constructivism” here, as I make no argument that texts are without inherent meaning. My position on this issue is briefly described in Turning the Soul, 196, note 2.
22. The term “text” is used broadly to refer to any object, for example a book, film, or artifact, whose meaning is unclear and whose features are complex enough to permit exploration of the meaning.
23. Here is the reference to Plato: The creation of meaning described here appears to have much in common with the slave’s growing recognition of the height and length required to double the area of a square (Meno, 82-86). Socrates argues that his questioning draws out of the slave — prompts him to “recollect” — that which he knows already. The Wittgensteinian/Gadamerian perspective urged here explains the growth of meaning differently, as shall be shown.
24. Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon, Turning the Soul: Teaching Through Conversation in the High School, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 105.
25. Ibid., 106.
26. One might wish to assert that X is “thinking” when X makes certain non-verbal signs, for example, writing on paper when others in the discussion speak, nodding in agreement at another’s remark, or shaking the head in a way that signals vehement opposition to a comment. But the inference that X is thinking is itself based upon certain rules that the observer assumes the discussant is following — rules for non-verbal participation in the conversation that contribute to construction of meaning. If three people nod enthusiastically when a comment is made, they are helping to construct acceptance of a point which if, unquestioned, will open the possibility for certain new questions about the text. So, non-verbal participation can suggest that a participant is “thinking” when it is seen to contribute to the construction of meaning.
27. Indeed, given the resources of computers, including Internet and local networks, students can work together developing questions and responses to questions, so that the conversation can continue after class discussion ends.
28. One aspect of my current research focuses upon the use of interpretive discussion to teach mathematics.