2. Such as the work of Paul M. Churchland,Matter and Consciousness: a Contemporary Introduction to Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992). For a good critique of contemporary materialism in philosophy of mind, see David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

3. The constructivist supposition to the contrary is well put by Thelma Z. Lavine: "The distinguishing feature of interpretationism, from the German Enlightenment through American pragmatism to mid-twentieth century Wissenssoziologie is an affirmation of the activity of mind as a constituent element in the object of knowledge. Common to all of these philosophical movements...is the epistemological principle that mind does not apprehend an object which is given to it in completed form, but that through its activity of providing an interpretation or conferring meaning or imposing structure, mind in some measure constitutes or 'creates' the object known"; Thelma Z. Lavine, "Knowledge as Interpretation: An Historical Survey," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10 (1949-50): 526-40, and 11 (1950-51): 88-103; 526). Hegel, pragmatic realists such as Peirce, Dewey, Will, and now John McDowell, contend that empirical knowledge must be interpretive in order to recreate, not to create, the object known.

4. John McDowell, Mind and World, passim (he sets up this issue on pp. 3-9); this is the positive point of his proposal to transcend the repeated oscillations between various forms of "the given" in empirical knowledge (which offers an account of content and truth, but no adequate account of justification) and "coherentism" (which offers an account of justification, but sacrifices any plausible account of content and truth), taken together with his recognition that so much of our conceptual and intellectual resources - which are crucial for formulating and justifying our cognitive claims - are inherited from our cultural and intellectual traditions (see the references given below in note 6).

5. See Kenneth R. Westphal, Hegel's Epistemological Realism (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 1, 62-64, 67, 155-88. For a brief presentation of some key points, see Kenneth R. Westphal, "Harris, Hegel, and the Truth about Truth," in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Reappraisal, ed. G. Browning, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), 23-29; and Kenneth R. Westphal, "Hegel," in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Ernest Sosa and Jonathan Dancy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 167-70; Frederick Will, Pragmatism and Realism (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), chaps. 3-5. Only recently have analytic epistemologists recognized that social accounts of human knowledge can be consistent with realism; see the contributions by Alston, Kitcher, Longino, and Solomon in Socializing Epistemology, ed. Frederick Schmitt (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994).

6. John McDowell, Mind and World, 84-85, 98-99, 126, 184-87 and Will, Pragmatism and Realism, chap. 6. In a word, the assumption that reason must be independent of tradition in order to assess it ascribes nothing less than divine powers to human reason and disregards the possibility of and prospects for internal criticism and self-criticism. On this latter, see Kenneth R. Westphal, "Hegel's Solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion," in The Phenomenology of Spirit Reader, ed. Jon Stewart (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), 76-91; or much more briefly, Kenneth R. Westphal, "Dialectic (Hegel)," in Sosa and Dancy, A Companion to Epistemology, 98-99.

7. Burge has written a long series of essays on this theme. One representative piece is "Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind," Journal of Philosophy 83, no. 12 (1986): 697-720, which contains references to some related articles. The harsh reception of his work by traditional individualists in philosophy of mind shows how tenacious is the effect of the dichotomies identified here. The basic line of response by individualist philosophers of mind has been to define into existence a "narrow" notion of mental content which includes all and only those aspects of propositional attitudes that are independent of an individual's social and physical environment. This move directly parallels Descartes' defining sensing in the "strict" sense as whatever he seems to perceive (Meditation 2).

8. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (Berlin: 1780).

9. Thomas Green, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1999).

10. "What Pragmatism Is" (1905), in Collected Papers, ed. C. Hartshorn & P. Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-35), vol. 4:272, §111; quoted by Frederick L. Will, Pragmatism and Realism, 182.

11. This is important for understanding the perpetuation of the specious dichotomies criticized here. Here it is philosophers of mind who have much to learn from philosophers of education, though I doubt they will rush to do so. A concerted effort to redirect philosophers' attention to root philosophical concerns with education is made by Philosophers on Education, ed. Amélie Rorty (London: Routledge, 1998). Also see Women's Philosophies of Education: Thinking Through Our Mothers, ed. Connie Titone and Karren Maloney (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Merrill-Prentice-Hall, 1999).

12. See Will, Pragmatism and Realism, chap. 5. For a good recent discussion of constructivism in science, see Jan Golinski, Making Natural Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

13. Henry Allison, "We can act only under the Idea of Freedom," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 71, no. 2 (1997): 39-50, 44.

14. McDowell, Mind and World, 13.

15. John Dewey clearly recognized the importance of mature judgment for individual autonomy: "If a man's actions are not guided by thoughtful conclusions, then they are guided by inconsiderate impulse, unbalanced appetite, caprice, or the circumstances of the moment. To cultivate unhindered, unreflective external activity is to foster enslavement, for it leaves the person at the mercy of appetite, sense, and circumstance"; John Dewey, How We Think (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1933), 4. To be sure, Dewey advocates the integration of affect and intellect, and as an ardent philosopher of education, he recognized that achieving mature judgment and individual autonomy is a collective undertaking. Another noteworthy book contending that communal resources are required to develop and exercise individual autonomy is Philip Pettit, Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

16. However, as teachers we too have succumbed to many pressures toward simplifying and routinizing our assessment of student performance in ways that not only do not assess mature judgment, but indeed tend to thwart its development. Many standard methods for assessing student performance must be reconsidered and revised. See Randall R. Curren, "Coercion and the Ethics of Grading and Testing," in Ethics in Education, ed. David E.W. Fenner (New York: Garland, 1999), 199-221.

17. Both McDowell (Mind and World, 117-18) and Cunningham appeal to Marx's graphic description of the grinding toil of early machinofacture. While such working conditions still can be found in various economies (including sweatshops in North America), in Western Europe and North America this kind of grinding toil is no longer the main problem posed by our commercial economies to proper human development. As John Kenneth Gallbraith noted in a recent interview broadcast on "Morning Edition," National Public Radio [U.S.] 16 October 1998, one of the most impressive and welcome recent achievements of Western economies is the liberation of the vast majority of our populations from grinding manual labor. The main problems posed by our commercial economies are the more diffuse - though very pervasive and influential - kinds noted (very briefly) here. Also see Green, Voices, chap. 5, esp. 131-40.

18. Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), 8. This text will be cited as AD for all subsequent references.

19. See Kenneth R. Westphal, "Hegel, Formalism, and Robert Turner's Ceramic Art." Jahrbuch für Hegelforschung 3 (1997): 259-83 and John Dewey, Art as Experience (1934; reprint, New York: Capricorn, 1958), chap. 3.

20. See Adrian Piper, "Critical Hegemony and Aesthetic Acculturation," Nous 19, no. 1 (1985): 29-40.

21. Green, Voices, 10-15, 30-31.