2. C.J.B. Macmillan, "Love and Logic in 1984," in Philosophy of Education 1984, ed. Emily E. Robertson (Normal, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1985), 3-16.

3. Umberto Eco, Travels in Hyper-Reality, trans. W. Weaver (London: Picador, 1987), 125.

4. Richard Bernstein, "The Rage Against Reason," in Construction and Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific Rationality, ed. Ernan McMullin (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 216.

5. The quotation is from Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 86. As quoted in Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 7.

6. Paul Horwich, "Gibbard's Theory of Norms," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, (1993): 67.

7. Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate, 147.

8. Eco, Travels in Hyper-Reality, 131.

9. James E. McClellan, Jr., "Margonis's Challenge," in Philosophy of Education 1997, ed. Susan Laird (Urbana, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1998), 375.

10. Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 163.

11. Embedded in the concept of rational judgment is the assumption that some ways of forming beliefs or deciding how to act or what ends to seek are more likely to meet with success than are others. The modes of judgment and the reasons they provide are not properly thought of as merely instrumental means to their ends, however, but must recommend the belief or action in question: rationality is a normative concept. See Roderick Firth, "Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental," in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Society 55 (1981), 5-23. See also J. David Velleman, Practical Reflection (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), especially chap. 7.

12. Eco, Travels in Hyper-Reality, 131-32.

13. Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," The Journal of Philosophy 79 (April 1982): 183.

14. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 7.

15. See Thomas F. Green, Activities of Teaching (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), chap. 3.

16. P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London: Methuen, 1974), 9.

17. Anne Seller, "Realism versus Relativism" in Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy, ed. Morwenna Griffiths and Margaret Whitford (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 180. I do not think Seller is exactly right here. There may be things we need to know about the world in order to work out relations of peace and equality. I am enough of a Deweyan to think that even ethical concepts need to be modified in light of the experiences produced by living under them; it is not simply a matter of our "social constructions." The questions here can be extremely difficult. For example, after a brutal and repressive regime has ended, do we need to know who committed what crimes even if we decide not to punish the offenders?

18. Interest group politics and mediation can be viewed as aspects of participation in a democratic form of political life. While consideration of the stance of democratic participation does not appear to reveal new aspects of the stance of rational persuasion, it does raise questions about the role of the latter with respect to the former. Both reason's friends and reason's foes claim their epistemological/metaphysical position is friendly to democracy. Dewey, famously, saw affinities between rational inquiry as modeled by the scientific community and democratic social relations. But Rorty, while championing solidarity over objectivity, finds his own brand of pragmatism especially hospitable to democracy. He writes: "We pragmatists commend our antiessentialism and antilogocentrism on the ground of its harmony with the practices and aims of a democratic society." See Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 135. What role should rational persuasion play in maintaining democratic traditions? Certainly there is a difference between being outvoted and being wrong, between losing in a fair, democratic decision-making process and discovering one has an obligation to lose. It's the difference between the stance of rational persuasion and the alternatives that is the focus of this analysis. When the stance of rational persuasion should be adopted is a difficult pragmatic question.

19. Jeffrey Rosen, "Annals of Justice: One Angry Woman," The New Yorker, 24 February and 3 March 1997, 54-64.

20. Elizabeth Gross [now Grosz], "What is Feminist Theory?" in Feminist Challenges, ed. Carole Pateman and Elizabeth Gross (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 177.

21. See Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984); See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

22.Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 9.

23. Richard Rorty, "Freud and Moral Reflection," in Pragmatism's Freud, ed. J.H. Smith and W. Kerrigan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15.

24. See Robert A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (New York: Basic Books, 1966), chap. 3.

25. K. Anthony Appiah, "The Limits of Pluralism," in Multiculturalism and American Democracy, ed. Arthur M. Melzer et al. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1998), 4l.

26. Ibid., 40, 44.

27. See Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties." See also Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25-73.

28. Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" in From Modernism to Postmodernism, An Anthology, ed. Lawrence Cahoone (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), p. 573. (Originally published in Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 21-34.)

29. We might connect the stance of loyalty with our earlier discussion of interest group politics. In the section on interest group politics, I considered the relationship between a representative of the relevant group and those regarded as outsiders. In that case, no openness to losing was possible on the key issues. Loyalty becomes like interest group politics when considering conversation outside the group. In this section, I have been considering what the in-group relationship is like. Here I think the possibilities are more complex. In-group conversation can be a form of rational persuasion in which the features that bind the group together are given substantial weight. (My earlier reference to theological debate within a religious group is an example.) Here the loyalty lies in establishing what counts as a reason. Or it may be that membership in the group is made a requirement of participation in the conversation because only with those who are "one of us" is it possible to have a fully open debate. But there is also the mode of relationship, the stance, in which it is the fact of the bond itself which takes priority. It is here that the contrast with the stance of rational persuasion is clearest.

30. Joyce Trebilcot, "Dyke Methods," in Lesbian Philosophies and Culture, ed. Jeffner Allen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), 15-29. As quoted in Linda Alcoff, "The Problem of Speaking for Others," in Feminist Nightmares: Women at Odds, ed. Susan Weisser and Jennifer Fleischner (New York: NYU Press, 1994), 186.

31. Alcoff, "The Problem of Speaking for Others," 186.

32. Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 172.

33. Ibid., 193.

34. See Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?"

35. Audrey Thompson, "A Modest Proposal for Preventing Philosophers of Education from Being a Burden to their Students or Their Country; and for Making Them Beneficial to Their Publick," Educational Foundations 12, no. 3 (1998), 68. See also Scott H. Bilow, "Rationality Overrated?" in Philosophy of Education 1997, ed. Susan Laird (Urbana, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1998), 486-90.

36. Ibid., 70.

37. Appiah, "The Limits of Pluralism," 45.

38. Eco, Travels in Hyper-Reality,131-32.