2. John Covaleskie, "Discipline and Morality: Beyond Rules and Consequences," Educational Forum 56, no. 2 (1992): 173-83.

3. For a fuller account, see David Gauthier, Morals By Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), esp. chap. 6.

4. Joseph Raz, "Liberating Duties," Law and Philosophy 8, no. 1 (1989): 3-21.

5. Michael Moore, "Choice, Character, and Excuse," in Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law, ed. Michael Louis Corrado (New York: Garland, 1994), 197.

6. See, for example, David Bazelon, "The Morality of the Criminal Law," and Richard Delgado, "'Rotten Social Background': Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?" in Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law, 519-44 and 571-91; For an extended discussion, see James Q. Wilson, Moral Judgment (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 84-102.

7. It is examined in Kent Greenawalt, "The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse," Columbia Law Review 84, no. 4 (1984), 1897-1927, and George Fletcher, "The Individualization of Excusing Conditions," in Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law, 53-94.

8. Bazelon makes this point in criminal law, arguing that the acquittal of an offender based on a history of deprivation serves notice that society has failed to fulfill its responsibility to that person. See Bazelon, "The Morality of Criminal Law," 523 n. 4 and 536-39.