2.Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).

3. Many philosophers of care extend this mindfulness to the network of relationships one has to all of nature, but Gilligan does not go this far; "The most basic questions about human living - how to live and what to do - are fundamentally questions about human relations, because people's lives are deeply connected, psychologically, economically, and politically. [One should] Refram[e] these questions to make these relational realities explicit - how to live in relationship with others, what to do in the face of conflict"; Gilligan, In a Different Voice, xiv.

4. In fact, Judith Shklar notes that notions of justice are largely shaped by a willingness to care: "The difference between misfortune and injustice frequently involves our willingness and our capacity to act or not to act on behalf of the victims, to blame or absolve, to help, mitigate, and compensate, or to just turn away....The line of separation between injustice and misfortune is a political choice, not a simple rule that can be taken as a given"; Judith N. Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), 2 , 5 and Gilligan, In a Different Voice, xxvii.

5. Terms such as noticing and imagining are not proper behavioral terms because they do not refer to observable phenomena, but they name clusters of observable activities that are most profitably interpreted as having intentional purposes and effects. For example, a behaviorist would not hesitate to call a certain series of repeated glances followed by a change of facial expression an act of noticing.

6. Gilligan, In a Different Voice, 11. Again, Shklar notes that this kind of sensitivity to particularity is one of the means by which notions of justice are shaped: "The normal model of justice...limits itself to matching [the] situation [of victims] against the rules, which is inadequate as a way of recognizing victims. Victimhood has an irreducibly subjective component that the normal model of justice cannot easily absorb....Who is to say what rules, if any, do or do not permit a group to feel victimized?" Shklar, The Faces of Injustice, 37.

7.Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xvi. Compare John Dewey: "All friendship and intimate affection are...the result of information about another person ... as it becomes an integral part of sympathy through the imagination. It is when the desires and aims, the interests and modes of response of another become an expansion of our own being that we understand him"; John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, 1934), 336.

8. Friar Diego de Landa, Yucatan Before and After the Conquest, trans. William Gates (1566; reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1978), 30.

9. Gilligan, In a Different Voice, xiii.

10. Ibid., xix.

11. Ibid., 71.

12. "Pragmatism and Liberalism Between Dewey and Rorty," Political Theory 22, no. 3 (1994): 391-413.

13. John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), 90.

14. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 217.

15. "[W]ithout the protection of something like the institutions of bourgeois liberal society, people will be less able to work out their private salvations, create their private self-images, reweave their webs of belief and desire in the light of whatever new people and books they happen to encounter"; Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 84-85.

16. It may seem that I have begged the question of whether the caring virtue of tolerance and the democratic virtue of noninterference are identical, since I have made them so by definition, in invoking the Dewey/Rorty distinction between persuasion and force to define them both. But in each case I reached that definition by a different path. The commitment to avoid force in working for solidarity is, on the one hand, a form of compassion - a means of avoiding cruelty - and on the other, a political contract of reciprocal protection.